Currency unions and heterogeneous trade effects : the case of the Latin Monetary Union by Timini, Jacopo
CURRENCY UNIONS
AND HETEROGENEOUS TRADE 
EFFECTS: THE CASE OF THE LATIN 
MONETARY UNION
Jacopo Timini
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1739
2017
CURRENCY UNIONS AND HETEROGENEOUS TRADE EFFECTS: 
THE CASE OF THE LATIN MONETARY UNION
CURRENCY UNIONS AND HETEROGENEOUS TRADE EFFECTS: 
THE CASE OF THE LATIN MONETARY UNION
Jacopo Timini (*)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1739
2017
(*) Senior economist at the Banco de España and PhD Candidate in Economic History at Carlos III University, 
Madrid. E-mail: jacopo.timini@bde.es. The views expressed in this manuscript are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. I would like to express my gratitude 
to my advisors Stefano Battilossi and Pilar Nogues-Marco, and to Markus Lampe for their extensive and insightful 
comments and many discussions on early versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Antonio Tena for sharing his 
international trade database. I wish to thank the editors and participants of the EREH Fast Track Meeting for their 
detailed comments, particularly Dan Bogart, Joan Roses, Nikolaus Wolf and Neil Cummins. I also would like to 
thank Marc Flandreau, Gianni Toniolo, Rui Esteves, Kim Oosterlinck, Claude Diebolt, Oskar Broberg, Thomas 
Sattler, Galo Nuño Barrau, Gianluigi Mengarelli, Jordi Domenech, Pablo Martinelli, Peter Bent, the Director of the 
Luzzatti Archive – Carlo Urbani – and its archivists, the participants at the SEP LUISS School of Political Economy 
internal seminar, and the Bank of Italy researchers in economic history, in particular Federico Barbiellini Amidei, 
Matteo Gomellini and Carlo Ciccarelli, and the participants at the November 2014 MacroHist workshop at the 
Graduate Institute in Geneva, the October 2015 ESTER RDC at Goteborg University, the December 2015 Banque 
de France-SciencesPo-MacroHist conference at the Banque de France in Paris, and the May 2016 IMPRESS 
meeting at Carlos III University in Madrid. I also wish to acknowledge funding from the People Programme (Marie-
Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under REA grant 
agreement no. 608129 (MACROHIST). All remaining errors are mine.
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2017
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Abstract
The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) agreement signed in December 1865 by France, Italy, 
Belgium and Switzerland standardised gold and silver coinage in member countries and 
allowed free circulation of national coins in the Union. In his seminal study, Flandreau (2000) 
found no evidence of an overall positive effect of the LMU on trade. In this paper, I estimate the 
effects of this currency agreement on trade. In my gravity model I explicitly take into account 
the changing conditions in the international environment that affected the LMU’s underlying 
economic foundations (i.e. the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 1874) and its rules (i.e. 
the “liquidation clause” of 1885). I also test the existence of heterogeneous effects on bilateral 
trade within the LMU. In line with Flandreau, I fi nd no signifi cant LMU trade effects. However, 
I fi nd support for the hypothesis that the LMU had signifi cant trade effects for the period 
1865-1874. These effects were nonetheless concentrated in trade fl ows between France and
the rest of the LMU members, following a hub-and-spokes structure. Moreover, I fi nd evidence 
for the existence of an 1874 “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the course of trade 
fl ows within the Union.
Keywords: international trade, currency unions, Latin Monetary Union, gravity model, 
bimetallism.
JEL classifi cation: F45, N73.
Resumen
El acuerdo de la Unión Monetaria Latina (UML), fi rmado en diciembre de 1865 por Francia, 
Italia, Bélgica y Suiza, estandarizó la acuñación de monedas de oro y plata en los países 
miembros y permitió la libre circulación de las monedas nacionales en la Unión. En un 
infl uyente estudio, Flandreau (2000) no encontró evidencia de un efecto positivo general 
de la UML sobre el comercio. En este trabajo se estiman los efectos de este acuerdo 
monetario sobre el comercio utilizando un modelo de gravedad, que tiene en cuenta, de 
forma explícita, las condiciones cambiantes en el entorno internacional que afectaron a los 
fundamentos económicos subyacentes a la UML (es decir, los límites a la acuñación de 
las monedas de plata en 1874) y sus disposiciones (es decir, la «cláusula de liquidación» 
de 1885). En este marco, el estudio prueba la existencia de efectos heterogéneos sobre 
el comercio bilateral dentro de la UML. En línea con Flandreau, no se encuentra un efecto 
signifi cativo de la UML sobre el comercio. Sin embargo, la evidencia presentada apoya la 
hipótesis de que la UML tuvo efectos signifi cativos sobre el comercio en el período 1865-
1874. Estos efectos, no obstante, se concentraron en los fl ujos comerciales entre Francia 
y el resto de los miembros de la UML, siguiendo una estructura hub-and-spokes. Además, 
se encuentra evidencia de la existencia de una ruptura estructural a nivel de UML en 1874, 
que afectó a la evolución de los fl ujos comerciales dentro de la Unión.
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, uniones monetarias, Unión Monetaria Latina, 
modelos de gravedad, bimetalismo.
Códigos JEL: F45, N73.
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I. Introduction
Did the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) generate significant effects on trade? And, were these effects, if
any, homogenously or heterogeneously distributed across members?
Despite the LMU lasted more than 6 decades (1865-1927), between the 19th and the 20th century, only
few contemporary economic historians put this international agreement at the centre of their research
(Flandreau, 2000; Flandreau and Mauriel, 2005; Einaudi, 1997, 2000 and 2001).
This monetary convention signed in 1865 by Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland (later joined by
Greece in 1868), aimed to introduce a harmonised framework – agreed by intergovernmental
procedures – for the coinage and exchange of specie, i.e. to create a common currency standard. The
agreement was parsimonious, devising a basic set of rules associated with very light enforcement. In the
absence of a supranational structure, the delegated powers, the practical implementation, and the
ordinary functioning of the Union were delegated to national institutions. The latter, subjected to legal
arrangements whose loopholes left them ample room of manoeuvre, could favour or hinder the
process of both monetary and trade integration. For example, they could restrict de facto the
acceptance and convertibility of foreign coins in the domestic banking system, and possibly use
different standards depending on the country of origin, thus generating heterogeneous effects.
Following recent methodological updates (i.e. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, Glick and Rose, 2016), and
adapting them to a reality of “comprehensive importance”1 such as the LMU, I use a recently
published database (RICardo) on international trade in historical perspective, and an innovative
approach (Gowa and Hicks, 2013) to identify “within”-Union trade effects. This allows for the
existence of heterogeneous effects on trade flows, which may have occurred for a number of reason,
ranging from the structure of trade itself to finance and politics.
Using, first, a gravity model and, second, structural break analysis, on one hand I confirm the results of
the pioneering work of Flandreau (2000), who found an insignificant effect of the LMU on overall
within-Union trade. On the other hand, I explicitly consider factors related to the changing conditions
in the international environment affecting the LMU underlying economic foundations (i.e. the limits on
silver coinage established in 1874) and the rules of the Union (i.e. the new terms for coin redemption
agreed in the “liquidation clause” of 1885). In these cases, the data support the hypothesis that the
LMU had significant trade effects for the period 1865-1874. These effects were nonetheless
concentrated in the flows between France and the rest of LMU members. Finally, I confirm that only in
1874 (and not in 1885) there was a “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the evolution of trade
flows within the Union.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II provides a brief literature review, trying to build bridges
between monetary unions and trade within a hub-and-spokes perspective. Section III details a short
history of the LMU, with particular attention to the decline of bimetallism and the “liquidation clause”.
Section IV discusses the methodological approach, mainly dealing with issues inherent to gravity
1 In his encyclopaedic work “A History of Banking in all the leading nations” (1896), Sumner decides to devote an entire
chapter to the LMU despite framing its analysis within national boundaries otherwise. This is due to the belief of the author
that “the Monetary Union which since 1865 has bound France to Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece is of […]
comprehensive importance in its bearings upon the coin and auxiliary circulations of the allied countries” (Sumner, 1896,
Vol.3, p.345).
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models, and describes the RICardo database.2 Section V discusses the results, and provides a new
interpretation of the Union’s trade effects within a hub-and-spokes framework. Section VI summarises
and concludes.
II. Literature review
Theoretical contributions on regional monetary integration date back to Mundell’s (1961) seminal paper
on optimum currency areas. However it was only in the wake of the EMU, that the debate gained
definitely momentum. The European Commission (1990) released a comprehensive report in support
of the process of integration, providing an in-depth cost-benefit analysis on the consequences of a
currency union.3 Recently, De Grauwe (2014) and Krugman (2013) offered clear updates on the
advantages and disadvantages associated to a currency union.4 On the other side, the empirical literature
reached its height at the dawn of the Euro,5 when Rose (2000) obtained impressively large positive
effects of the use of a common currency on bilateral trade flows (+>200%).6 Rose’s paper prepared
the ground for the debate on the possible effects of the Euro, and served as a catalyst for fostering
research in this domain. Successive studies critically looked to the exceptional magnitude of Rose’s
initial estimations.7 Baldwin (2006) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) provide extensive and lively
literature reviews of this debate, highlighting some errors that may affect not only Rose’s results, but a
large part of the following works based on gravity models: omitted variable bias; model mis-
specification; and endongeneity8 (see also Persson, 2001). Indeed, the consensus among scholars is that
these issues should be fully taken into account in gravity models of bilateral trade to avoid biases in
estimations (Flam and Nordström, 2006; Barro and Tenreyro, 2007; Baier and Bergstrand; 2007). In the
literature, this is implemented mainly through the use (of different combinations) of country-pair and
time effects, and favouring poisson or semi-poisson estimations (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006)
instead of OLS regressions.
Quantitative economic historians also looked with particular interest at trade related effects of different
exchange rate regimes, being the gold standard the focus of the literature (Lampe and Sharp, 2014).
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) investigated empirically the influence of the gold standard on
bilateral trade flows. Their findings support the hypothesis that being on gold fostered commercial
2 In a previous version of this paper we also used a reduced version of the Tena DB (Tena, forthcoming), with three year
average trade flows.
3 Despite the 2008 crisis unveiled a degree of “wishful thinking” (Krugman, 2013) – the piece in itself constitute an
unprecedented effort assembling together contributions (347 pages in total) from eminent scholars and economists both
from inside and outside the Commission. While acknowledging its limitations, we are convinced that it remains a valid
reference.
4 However, in the 19th century the state of knowledge and the level of sophistication regarding the economic consequences
of currency union were extremely different, as exhaustively documented by Einaudi (2001) and Flandreau (2000, 2003), who
adapted the debate to that historical reality.
5 Rose decided to refer directly to the European Commission study (1990, op. cit.) in the title of his paper: “One Money,
One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade”.
6 Even being completely aware of its criticism and further methodological improvements in the literature, Rose’s paper
(2000) remains “the most influential international economics paper” of its decade (Frankel, 2006, p.76).
7 See Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2002; Micco et al., 2003; Rose and Stanley, 2004; Berger and Nitsch,
2005.
8 Baldwin (2006), Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baldwin et al. (2008) classified the errors following Olympics
terminology, such as “Gold, Silver, and Bronze medal” mistakes, dealing with omitted variable bias, mis-specification, and
time-related biases (i.e. the common use of the US price deflator).
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relations significantly, and up to +30%. The gold standard era is also of interest for monetary and
financial historians, as scholars aim to understand the political economy behind the decision of
adhering or not. Bordo and Rockoff (1996), Flandreau et al. (1998), and Meissner (2005) are seminal
contributions in this areas. However, this strand of literature will not be at the core of this study.9
Flandreau (2000) represents a solid work on the effects of currency unions on trade with both a
historical and an empirical approach, focussing on the Latin Monetary Union (LMU). Being published
the same year of Rose’s seminal paper, at that time the author could not be aware of the decade of
fierce debates that would have followed. Flandreau’s results derive from a standard gravity model, and
uses OLS regressions for cross-sectional data, repeated for three benchmark periods (1860s, 1870s,
1880s).10 The author identifies the LMU using a dummy variable “which takes the value one when both
countries in a pair belong to the 1865 Convention and zero when otherwise” (Flandreau, 2000, p.29),
concluding that the LMU did not introduce any considerable bias to bilateral trade, as its coefficient is
not statistically significantly different from zero in any of the three regressions. Flandreau and Mauriel
(2005) look more extensively to trade relations and business cycles correlations during the 19th century,
taking as references the LMU, the Scandinavian Currency Union (SCU)11 and the Austro-Hungarian
currency union. As in Flandreau (2000), the LMU is found having no influence on its members’
bilateral trade.
However, the literature inspired by Rose’s study does not investigate how further economic integration
on a regional basis, such as in the LMU case, may influence “within” and “external” trade flows. Egger
and Pfaffermayr (2013) are an exception. Their empirical work aimed at identifying differences across
intra-EU trade related to the process of European integration, separating countries on the basis of the
duration of their membership, but neglected political and economic factors. In this respect, Baldwin
(1994, 2006, 2008) advances the hypothesis of “hub-and-spoke” integration, where few leading nations
(the “hubs”) are better placed to generate interconnections with the other members (the “spokes”).
Following Baldwin’s arguments, these developments may be due either to the construction of a bilateral
preferential agreements network creating “artificial” relative advantages for the “hub(s)”, or to the
natural consequences of an underlying Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade involving exchanges of
differentiate goods between hub and spokes. In addition to Baldwin’s theory, Flandreau (2000) suggests
a role for the indirect effects of “investing abroad” within an area that envisaged a degree of monetary
integration.12 From a theoretical perspective, Albertin (2008) builds a framework where gains – in terms
of trade effects – are not equally distributed among members of the currency union and depend on
some (economic) “dissimilarities” among countries. Those “dissimilarities” can constrain the size of the
gains. From a completely different perspective – walking on a bridge between Marxism and more
traditional theories of international relations – dependency theory can also provide theoretical grounds
for differences between hub and spokes, due to economic and socio-political constraints and
distortions. These issues however are not explored in this paper.13
The LMU institutional framework may have constituted a trade-enhancing environment through closer
institutional relationships and an attempt of monetary harmonisation. However, as suggested by recent
9 For a brief summary see Martin-Aceña, Martinez-Ruiz and Nogues-Marco (2011); for a comprehensive literature review
see Morys (2011).
10 A maximum of 30 observations per period.
11 In his previous paper, Flandreau (2000) uses the SCU as a control variable.
12 For further discussion on the incentives related to economic integration sensu lato and particularly related to the EU
dimension, see Pelkmans and Brenton (1997). For a comprehensive discussion see Flandreau (2000).
13 For a thorough analysis of what dependency theory is, see Duvall (1978).
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trade theories, the LMU may not be a homogeneous construction that symmetrically shares benefits
and costs among its partners, but a sum of entities diversely affected by the Union and its
intergovernmental framework. For this reason, proxying the LMU with a single dummy could hide
heterogeneous dynamics caused by a variety of reasons, from the institutional framework to the
structure of trade.
The increasing availability of data, in parallel with several improvements in their treatment and
estimations methods, constitute pivotal steps for the empirical literature dealing with currency unions
and (bilateral) trade. In an historical context, two databases have been created recently, RICardo (for
further information see Dedinger and Girard, 2016) and Tena DB (Tena, forthcoming). The possibility
of exploiting these new sources and the application of up-to-date econometric techniques, may help to
shed additional light on the LMU-related trade issues. The additional introduction of two separate
dummies, for hub-and-spokes and spoke-to-spoke relationships, will allow to clarify “within” trade
phenomena. Finally, part of the analysis will also be devoted to understand possible beggar-thy-neighbor
effects, i.e. whether trade benefits were created at the expenses of non-member countries. To my
knowledge there is no previous contribution on this issue for my period of reference, and it may also
serve to check whether the results are compatible with the estimations of heterogeneous LMU effects.
III. Historical background
The establishment of the LMU was not motivated exclusively by the French ambition to increase its
political influence across Europe. It was also motivated by economic reasons (mainly related with the
willingness of deepening trade relationships), as well as growing federative ideas and solidarity
sentiments circulating throughout the continent (Flandreau, 2000; Einaudi; 2000). Those motivations
were also highlighted by influential policy-makers of that time:
“Back then in 1865, for a sentiment of federation and solidarity which prevailed
in all economic relations in Europe [...] [and] that had to bind all people in
currencies, exchanges, trade, common treaties, and for reasons of need, was
established the monetary convention”.14
(Luzzatti, 1881)15
Indeed, the birth of the LMU came after a turbulent period for the majority of the European currencies
– including those of the countries that will later join the LMU – partially related with the unexpected
decline in the price of gold (Einaudi, 2007). The unilateral responses to the destabilizing effects of wide
changes in the market bimetallic ratio often included modifications to the fineness of national silver
coins, in an effort to reduce their intrinsic value and reinforce the legal bimetallic ratio(s). This was, for
example, the case of Switzerland (1860) and Italy (1862). However, the lack of coordination fragmented
the European monetary system, as the new fineness of silver coins were not homogenous across
14 In Italian in the original: “Allora nel 1865, per un sentimento di federazione e di solidarietà che prevaleva in tutte le
relazioni economiche dell’Europa […][e] che doveva avvincere tutti i popoli nelle monete, nei traffici, nei commerci, in
trattati comuni, e per una ragione di necessità, fu stabilita la convenzione monetaria”
15 Please refer to Appendix I for further explanations on the pivotal importance of Luzzatti in Italian politics, and with
particular regards to trade, monetary and finance issues. Appendix I also provides extensive information on the relevance of
his personal archive – preserved at the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Venice – for this paper.
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countries. Perhaps, the 1865 monetary agreement was seen by policy-makers as the silver bullet capable
of removing “every impediment to free transaction among the inhabitants of the four [signatory] states,
deriving from the different fineness of their silver divisional currency”.16 Indeed, their objective was to
eliminate trade disruptions and speculations deriving from such monetary distortions. The
transcriptions of the debate in the Italian Parliament on the day of the approval of the agreement
support this view: “The silver coins fineness variance [across countries], apart from offering
opportunities to private speculations, had as an effect the restriction of the currency tender within the
borders of the country of origin, so it is easy to imagine the consequent perturbations on the exchanges
with the neighbouring populations.” 17
However, since its creation, the LMU was a purely intergovernmental structure (see Appendix III for a
complete chronology of LMU conferences and their main achievements),18 which did not foresee any
mechanisms or criteria clearly defining rights and obligations of the member states within the decision
making process, consequently favouring international relations based on a hierarchical distribution of
power (Fabbrini, 2015).19 In addition, the LMU had to struggle for adapting with an ever-changing
European and global economic situation. It underwent several structural reforms in a long-lasting fight
for survival, which finally lost de jure in 1927. However, de facto its relevance started to fade away well
before, already in the 1870s-1880s. In these two decades the LMU faced several challenges, but the
historical literature usually highlight two major ones. The first was an external threat: bimetallism
stability was declining and, contemporaneously, the gold standard was emerging as the overarching
monetary reference (Flandreau and Oosterlinck, 2012; Meissner, 2005). The rise of the latter was
neither inevitable nor happened abruptly, as it was the result of a combination of economic and
political factors, deriving from the rivalry between Germany and France (Flandreau, 2003). Potentially,
market expectations on the viability of silver as a fundamental part of a global bimetallic standard could
have been intertwined to those on the future of the LMU and its institutional architecture, indirectly
influencing trade. Markets change their views in 1874, following the French (late 1873) and LMU (early
1874) silver minting restrictions, with a gradual adjustment of their beliefs on the sustainability of the
bimetallic standard throughout the year (Flandreau, 1996; Flandreau, 2003; Flandreau and Oosterlinck,
2012). The second was an internal challenge: the troubled revision of the treaty in 1885 – Belgium
temporarily left the Union – ended with the introduction of a “liquidation clause” (Cottrell et al., 2007),
the new Article XIV of the agreement. The provision foresaw that:
“In case of the denunciation of this convention, each of the contracting states
shall be bound to redeem the silver 5-franc pieces which it shall have issued, and
16 In Italian in the original. See draft bill presented to the Italian Parliament for the approval of the LMU, 16 April 1866:
“Signori! Il 23 dicembre 1865 è stata conchiusa e sottoscritta a Parigi fra i Governi d’Italia, Francia, Belgio e Svizzera una
convenzione intesa a stabilire un mutuo accordo nella rispettiva legislazione monetaria e togliere ogni impedimento alle
libere transazioni fra gli abitanti de’ quattro Stati, derivante dal diverso titolo della loro moneta divisonaria dello scudo
d’argento”. Available at https://archivio.camera.it/.
17 Ibid. In italian in the original: “Cotesta varietà di titolo negli spezzati dello scudo d’argento, a parte lo allettamento che
offriva a profittevoli speculazioni private, ebbe necessariamente per effetto di restringere il corso delle stesse monete entro i
confirni de’ singoli stati d’origine, con quale perturbazione negli scambi delle popolazioni limitrofe è facile immaginare.”
18 In the course of its existence, LMU Member States organised 13 conferences for a varied set of purposes; more precisely
in 1865 (founding convention), 1874, 1875, 1876, 1878, 1879, 1885, 1893, 1897, 1902, 1908, 1920 and 1921. In addition,
International Monetary Conferences, where LMU members attended regularly, were held in 1867, 1878, 1881, and 1892. For
further details, see De Cecco (1996).
19 On the topic of intergovernmentalism and distribution of power, see Fabbrini (2015). To have an interdisciplinary
overview on the consequences of an increased intergovernmentalism, see Adams, Fabbrini and Larouche (2016).
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which shall be in the circulation or the public treasuries of the other states, by
paying to those states a sum equal to the nominal value of the coins redeemed”
(LMU Convention, signed on 6 November 1885)
The international “liquidation of balances”, i.e. the repatriation of the respective silver coins to other
LMU members, was an inconvenience arising from the constant depreciation of silver (with respect to
gold), and a particular concern for France, which “held much more coin issued form the Mints of
Belgium and Switzerland, and to some extent Italy, than was held by these Governments of the French
coins” (New York Times, 1885). The transformation fuelled through this channel was believed to be so
important for the member states, that they decided to stipulate a special arrangement – delineating the
details of its potential implementation – and appended it to the convention (De Cecco, 1996; Bae and
Bailey, 2011). In Willis (1901, p.236) own words, “the ratification of the treaty of 1885 really meant the
abrogation of the Latin Union and the substitution of a new monetary league in its place”.20 The change of
the rules, and the new division of risks and responsibilities arising from it, could also have been a game
changer in the domain of international trade, as it was hampering the easiness of moving coins across
borders.
Therefore, changes in LMU’s rules and institutions should be taken explicitly into account in the
empirical analysis of trade determinants. Indeed, as stated by Gowa and Hicks (2013), “[p]olitically
powerful states can create agreements and institutions and implement them using the rules of the game
that have as their raison d’être the production of heterogeneous effects across their members.” In the
case of the LMU, the drivers that may have favoured the creation of heterogeneous effects could have
been the following: 1) the relevance of national institutions in implementing the monetary agreement –
for example the role of central banks21 in providing facilities to favour (or halt) the procedures of
exchanging coins, possibly discriminating by country of origin; 2) the changing “rules of the game” –
i.a. the inclusion of the “liquidation clause”, which in case of a dissolution of the Union, forced the
return of divisionary (silver) coins to the respective countries of issue, in exchange of gold at its legal
tender rate. Since Sumner (1896) and Willis (1901), the literature acknowledges the predominant role
exerted by France within the LMU. Indeed, it was Paris the place chosen to hold conferences and
meetings of the members of the Union, which – to use Sumner’s words – “has bound France to
Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece”. This vision is also supported by Einaudi, which refers to
France as the “hegemonic power” within the Union (Einaudi, 2000, p. 304).
Consequently, the empirical approach will devote particular attention to these two issues, i.e.
heterogeneous effects both in terms of geography (hub-and-spokes relationships) and institutions (due
to the changes and challenges outlined above in this paragraph).
20 Emphasis mine.
21 To simplify, we use here the term “central banks”. However, being in a transitory era where the institution of central bank
is steadily but not rapidly emerging, it would be more precise to refer to the institutions involved as “national banks of
issue”, or “national issuing banks”, this being particularly true in the cases of Italy and Switzerland for a relevant part of the
period under scrutiny.
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IV. Methodology and data
The quantitative analysis presented in this paper exploits RICardo,22 a publicly available database that
collects bilateral trade flows since the beginning of the 19th century onwards. The database includes
trade values of both imports and exports, providing comparable series of data for the period under
scrutiny.23 For every country pair (country A and country B), RICardo database shows four bilateral
trade data: imports from and exports to B recorded by A, and imports from and exports to A recorded
by B – i.e. mirror flows. Depending on the method used by each country to record trade flows,
discrepancies may emerge, and indeed are so common that a relevant part of the literature try to deal
with such issue (see Dedinger and Girard, 2016). For the purpose of this research, I used three criteria
to assemble the database: more reliable sources over less reliable sources (i.e. prioritising statistical
offices/bureaux with higher historically recognised capability), longer time-series data over shorter
time-series data (to avoid “jumps” in trade data only due to a change in the source used), and imports
data over exports data, as in a historical context they are more reliable (see i.a. Tena, 1992). The correct
selection of time and space boundaries also constitutes a key issue. Concerning space, I followed
Flandreau (2000), and restricted the analysis to intra-European trade flows. The sample is representative
as it is approximately equal to 80 per cent of total world trade (Bairoch, 1996). The period of analysis is
important for two main reasons: 1) endogeneity concerns and 2) understanding exactly what is
measured with the LMU dummy. To control for endogeneity, I follow Head and Mayer (2014), and I
include a period previous to the signature of the Monetary Convention. I expand the database
backward until 1861. It is not possible going further back, as this would imply a significant and non-
casual loss of observable dyads. Moreover, I should also highlight that Italy, a LMU member, became
unified only in that year.24 On the other end of the database, the LMU lasted de jure until 1927. There is
little doubt that after WWI the LMU lost completely its meaning (Bae and Bailey, 2011), however it is
still unclear when it is exactly its end de facto. Consequently, the paper will analyse the period 1861 –
1913, allowing for three different time specification for the LMU dummy, to cover the possibility to
have diverse trade effects related to a set of key events, which will be further discussed below in this
section – together with the rest of the variables. The final database consists of an unbalanced panel of
more than 6,500 dyads (see Table 1 for summary statistics), and contains 53 year of observation (1861-
1913).
22 RICardo – Research on International Commerce – is the result of the efforts of a team of economic historians, which
initiated the project in 2004, with the aim of assembling a unique database including all world’s bilateral trade flows, from
the 19th century until WWII (as after WWII trade statistics are published and available online). More information about the
project are available at www.ricardo.medialab.sciences-po.fr
23However, we are fully aware of the limitations of international trade historical statistics, with particular reference to
reliability and comparability. Indeed, until approximately 1850s statistics record values in constant prices; before 1870s they
mainly refer to the “port of transit”; since the 1870s they report the nationality of the vessel of origin. It is only at the
beginning of the 20th century when public officers in charge of statistics start to investigate further the real country of origin.
See Tena (1992) for further discussion.
24 The consequences of such “epoch-making event” (Federico and Tena, 2013, p.1) on trade are definitely not negligible.
Italian trade flows are not available before 1861, and despite the impressive efforts in the literature for reconstructing early
19th century imports and exports of “Italian” polities (Federico and Tena, 2013), these are not comparable and cannot be
included in the database
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the main variables
VARIABLES Description and sources N mean sd min max
imports Imports from country j to country iRICardo Database 6,503 4.259e+06 7.518e+06 0 8.041e+07
lnPOP Logarithm of population Maddison ProjectDatabase 6,650 18.48 1.416 15.50 21.81
lnGDP Logarithm of GDP Maddison Project Database 5,770 20.23 1.660 15.75 24.70
lndistcap Logarithm of the distance between capitalsCEPII GeoDist Database 6,650 6.905 0.621 5.153 8.003
contig Existence of a shared border in a dyadCEPII GeoDist Database 6,650 0.218 0.413 0 1
LMU
dummy variable for dyads where both
countries are LMU members (time-variant),
with three alternatives related to LMU effects:
1865-1913 (LMU), 1865-1885 (LMU1885),
and 1865-1874 (LMU1874)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.131 0.337 0 1
LMUFrance
dummy variable for dyads which includes
France (the hub) and any of the other LMU
members (a spoke) (time-variant), same three
alternatives as above (see LMU variable)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.0589 0.236 0 1
LMURest
dummy variable for dyads where both
countries are LMU members, but excluding
France (two spokes) (time-variant), same
three alternatives as above (see LMU variable)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.0716 0.258 0 1
GS
dummy variable for dyads where both
countries adhere to the gold standard (time-
variant)
Author’s elaboration on Officer
6,650 0.415 0.493 0 1
SCU
for dyads where both countries are members
of the Scandinavian Currency Union (time-
variant)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.0241 0.153 0 1
LMU-other
dummy variable for dyads where one country
is a LMU member and the other is not (time-
variant), same three alternatives as above (see
LMU variable)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.412 0.492 0 1
France-other
dummy variable for dyads which includes
France (the hub) and any other non-LMU
member (time-variant), same three
alternatives as above (see LMU variable)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.134 0.340 0 1
LMURest-
other
dummy variable for dyads where one country
is a LMU member (excluding France) and the
other is not (time-variant), same three
alternatives as above (see LMU variable)
Author’s elaboration
6,650 0.279 0.448 0 1
AllianceTreaty
Dummy variable signalling a formal alliance
(including mutual defense pacts, neutrality
and non-aggression treaties, ententes, etc.)
between the dyad (bilateral treaties) or among
a number of countries including those of the
dyad
Author’s elaboration on Correlates of War Project
6,650 0.0995 0.299 0 1
Source: Author’s elaboration
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The analysis relies on an augmented gravity model, based on the theoretical contributions of i.a.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), which explains bilateral trade
flows by transaction costs and economic size:
(1) ௜ܺ௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ln൫ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ כ ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧൯+ ߚଶܮܯ ௜ܷ௝௧ + ߚଷܩ ௜ܵ௝௧ + ߚସܵܥ ௜ܷ௝௧ +
+ߚହܣ݈݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܶݎ݁ܽݐݕ௜௝௧ + ߛ௜௧ + ߜ௝௧ + ߠ௜௝ + ߳௜௝௧
where ܺ௜௝௧ denotes the logarithm of nominal imports flows from country j (exporter) to country i
(importer) in year t.25 The economic size of country i and j at time t are proxied by the product of their
population (as in Huberman, Meissner and Oosterlinck, 2017), due to limited availability of GDP data
(used as robustness test). LMU is a dummy variable taking the value of one when both countries
pertain to the LMU and zero otherwise. This variable varies over time as the database include a period
prior to the Union, and also retains a (minimum) cross-sectional variance as not all members entered at
the same time. Such characteristics allows to include pair fixed effect in the model without incurring in
problems related with collinearity. In the “baseline”, the LMU is considered to last from 1865 to 1913.
Alternatively, two other dummies are constructed: LMU1874 and LMU1885. The first aim to
understand whether market beliefs on the sustainability of the bimetallic standard influenced the LMU
trade effects (LMU = 1 from 1865 to 1874). On the other hand, the second aims to understand
whether the changing nature of the treaty, and its “liquidation clause” in particular, was detrimental to
within-union trade flows (LMU = 1 from 1865 to 1885). In any of these three specifications, the LMU
dummy aims to quantify the “overall” LMU effects on trade (as in Flandreau, 2000). GS and SCU are
two additional control variables. GS is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if both countries i
and j are in the gold standard at time t, and zero otherwise. SCU is a dummy variable identifying the
Scandinavian Currency Union (=1 if both countries are SCU members and =0 otherwise).
“AllianceTreaty” is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a formal alliance (including
mutual defense pacts, neutrality and non-aggression treaties, ententes, etc.) between the dyad (bilateral
treaties) or among a number of countries including those of the dyad has been signed. Data are from
the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset. Different measures of military alliances, such as
“defense pacts”, which are “the highest level of military commitment, requiring alliance members to
come to each other’s aid militarily if attacked by a third party” (Gibler, 2009), are also used as further
robustness tests. Introducing another dummy identifying countries shadowing LMU standards would
have been ideal, however the limited number of observations contained in the database for such group
of countries (see Appendix II for the list of countries shadowing the LMU standards) do not allow to
do so. Following Head and Mayer (2014), I include in the main specification of the model also importer
time-varying effects (ߛ௜௧), exporter time-varying effects (ߜ௝௧), 26 and pair fixed effects (ߠ௜௝). In this way it
is possible to account for factors such as macroeconomic policies or consequences deriving from trade
treaties (i.e. tariff levels, a concern of particular importance due to the parallel development of the
Cobden-Chevalier network, see discussion below), importer and exporter GDP and GDP per capita
(separately), and other transaction costs, such as distance, contiguity, and common languages (including
pair fixed effects automatically excludes these variables from the equation due to collinearity).27 In
25 When “poisson” regression is used, then imports are inserted in level and not in logarithmic scale, as the poisson function
automatically adapts the level to its logarithmic correspondent.
26 Importer and exporter time-varying effects consist in importer and exporter fixed effects multiplied by year fixed effects.
27 Before the Baier and Bergstrand (2007) contribution, it was a standard procedure in literature to proxy for transaction
costs by measuring distance between countries pair (in logarithm), and including a dummy that takes value one when a dyad
has a common border (called “contiguity”). We do so in one robustness test (see Appendix VI). In our case distance
measures and contiguity dummies are from CEPII GeoDist Database. Distance therefore is a computation of geodesic
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particular, the inclusion of pair fixed effects is in line with Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggestion for
ruling out possible endogeneity biases deriving from previous level of trade exchanges (i.e. the
argument being that nations with intense trade relations can be more prone to reach an international
agreement, such as the LMU, among themselves), or other factors like pre-monetary convention
exchange rate agreements, informal coinage arrangements, previous homogenization of currency
standards. Separate model specifications with (a) importer and exporter fixed effects with year fixed
effects, and (b) importer and exporter time-varying effects have also been considered for comparative
purposes. However, the choice of including ߛ௜௧, ߜ௝௧, and ߠ௜௝ is in line with what suggested in the
literature (see i.a. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Using different specifications – as (a) and (b) – influence
the results, as expected, as the risk of incurring in an omitted variable bias is higher. Therefore, the
results of these models should be considered sub-optimal with respect to the specification included in
the text and should not be interpreted as robustness tests, as highlighted by Glick and Rose (2016). For
example, they do not take into account tariffs explicitly. Even though several papers relativised the role
of tariffs, they mainly focused on the beginning of my period of analysis. Indeed, Accominotti and
Flandreau (2008), i.a., argue that trade liberalisation (in the form of trade agreements) achieved little,
and this being particularly true in the 1860s-1870s decades, both for institutional and political reasons.
Lampe (2009) finds no effects of those years of liberalisation (by the means of bilateral treaties) on
overall trade, nevertheless he argues that product-specific preferences are effective in enhancing trade
in goods pertaining to the categories directly affected by non-generalised tariff reductions, mainly
manufacturing. In a successive publication, Lampe (2011) stresses the ex-ante economic and political
forces as main drivers and pillars of the success for this 19th century European integration experiment,
rather than any substantial overall ex-post results. In addition, Federico and Vasta (2015) argue that –
using Italy as a case study – trade restrictiveness measures were probably overestimating the tariff-based
protection, downplaying the role of tariffs in economic development during the pre-WWI era. On the
other hand, Flandreau and Mauriel (2005) include a measure of protection28 both for the importer and
the exporter country. For the period they analysed, 1880-1913, their inclusion has relevant effects on
the final estimations, particularly to those of the “gold standard” dummy and the “LMU” dummy. The
authors explain the variation in the gold standard dummy, i.e. reduction of the coefficient when
introducing protection measures, arguing that countries on gold were also relatively more prone to
“free trade” policy. The effect on LMU, i.e. the negative coefficient becoming not statistically
significant, may be linked to the disruptive Italian-French tariff war of the 1890s. Finally, ߚ଴ is the
constant and ߳௜௝௧ the error term.
In addition, to consistently test the hypothesis of different trade patterns between hub-and-spokes
flows and spoke-to-spoke flows, the LMU dummy is substituted by LMUFrance and LMURest, also
dummy variables. The former takes value one when describes dyads which includes France (the hub)
and any of the other LMU members (a spoke), and zero otherwise. The latter instead identify a bilateral
trade flow between two spokes, both LMU members (=1; and 0 otherwise)
(2) ௜ܺ௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ln൫ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ כ ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧൯+ ߚଶܮܯܷܨݎܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝௧ + ߚଷܮܯܷܴ݁ݏݐ௜௝௧ +
+ߚସܩ ௜ܵ௝௧ ++ߚହܵܥ ௜ܷ௝௧ ++ߚ଺ܣ݈݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ܶݎ݁ܽݐݕ௜௝௧ + ߛ௜௧ + ߜ௝௧ + ߠ௜௝ + ߳௜௝௧
distance on the basis of the “great circle formula” and using capital cities in term of population, “distcap” variable in CEPII
GeoDist Database. In addition, common language is also inserted in the regression as an additional robustness test (results
are not reported for simplicity, but are available upon request).
28 Protection is defined as “the ratio of custom revenues to total trade”.
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V. Results
The results from the gravity equation models are presented in Table 2. I confirm previous findings (i.a.
Flandreau, 2000), of an overall non-significant effect of LMU on within-Union bilateral trade flows
during the period 1865-1913. This is also true when separating flows between France and the rest of
LMU members on one side, and among the rest of the LMU members on the other. However, when
contemplating the LMU as “active” only for the periods when market still considered the bimetallic
standard as viable, the LMU produced positive effects on bilateral trade flows, but for those between
France and the other members, and not for those among the rest of members. These results are in line
with the historical evidence presented in this text.
Results in column 1 shows that the LMU did not exert any positive effects on trade among its
members, when considering 1865-1913 as a period of reference for its existence, i.e. from its creation
until the beginning of the WWI. Its “overall” effects are not significant. When discerning France-
related trade flows from the rest of the Union, results are again in line with the conventional knowledge
of no LMU-related trade effects (column 2). However, when interacting the LMU with a time dummy,
to focus on the period from 1865 to 1885, until the moment in which the “liquidation clause” is
introduced in the treaty, the coefficient of the LMU dummy becomes significant, and negative (column
3, LMU<0). This may reflect that trade links between France and the rest of the LMU were
deteriorating in the long term, as were the functioning of LMU institutions that may have cause such
drawback (column 4, LMUFrance<0). Nevertheless, in the 1865-1885 period the LMU coefficient is
positive (LMU1885>0), but these positive effects are concentrated in the flows from and to France
(column 4, LMUFrance1885>0). Overall, the “LMU” effects in 1865-1885 are not significantly
different from zero (LMU+LMU1885=0). However, when the period of LMU “de facto effectiveness” is
Finally, a variation of equation (II) is considered to test whether the trade-enhancing effects of the
monetary agreement where obtained at the expenses of non-members, i.e. if the creation of the LMU
had de facto beggar-thy-neighbor effects, as argued for other interwar agreements by a consistent part of the
historical literature (see i.a. Aldcroft, 2001). As suggested in Gowa and Hicks (2013) if the database
contains only a limited number of countries (16 in my case) it is preferable, due to a high risk of
collinearity, not to include at the same time dummies that – as in equation (1) and (2)– detect intra-
agreements trade flows (LMU, LMUFrance, LMURest, GS, SCU) and those that try to capture eventual
trade diversion effects (“beggar-thy-neighbor” dummies: LMU-other; France-other; and LMURest-other)
outside the block.
The quantitative analysis will rely on the use of Poisson estimators. Indeed, basic econometric
procedures, such as the OLS procedure has increasingly been challenged by scholars, i.a., Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006). The reasons for discarding OLS estimations in favour of Poisson may be
clustered in three major groups (Shepherd, 2009; UNCTAD and WTO, 2012): (1) Poisson estimator is
consistent with fixed effects, a rare property for a nonlinear maximum likelihood estimator; (2) it is able
to deal with zero values, a situation that may arise when there is no trade between a country pair,
automatically considering those observations in the estimates; (3) Coefficients obtained from a Poisson
regression are of unequivocal interpretation, and retain the same meaning as in OLS estimations with a
logarithmic dependent variable.
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reduced to 1865-1874, year in which markets started requiring a premium for silver (Flandreau and
Oosterlinck, 2012), meaning that the market started downgrading the chances of bimetallism to last,
LMU effects on trade flows are positive (column 5, LMU+LMU1874>0), and concentrated in the
flows from and to France (column 6, “LMUFrance1874”). France-directed trade may have several
explanations, ranging from the structure of trade itself to finance and politics. Indeed, the significant
effects on trade between France and the rest of members may be the consequence of an integration
that fostered the development of an underlying Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade, involving exchanges of
differentiate goods between the hub and the spokes. They can also be related to the enhancement of
capital exports – from France to the rest of the members – that in turn would boost trade, as part of
these financial flows “would lead to an increase in demand on the part of the borrowing nation of
foreign goods” (Flandreau, 2000). In addition, the contribution of France to monetary stability of the
LMU was also important, through the role of the Banque de France – the principal institution in the
LMU – in supporting both domestic and foreign silver (Flandreau, 1996), and this could have had
spillovers on trade. Summarising, as Luzzatti (1883, cited in Nardi Spiller, 1994, p. 366) remarked,
“bimetallism, limping as today, could not stand without that great centre of attraction and
compensation that is France”.29 However, as this research uses aggregate trade data, it is not possible to
separate empirically these effects.
Further, in line with what expected, the coefficients of other variables are stable across the different
specifications included in Table 2. The attraction “size” (the natural logarithm of the product of
population in country i and j) is positive and significant. The gold standard dummy is positive and
significant, in agreement with the literature on its trade enhancing role (i.a. Lopez-Cordova and
Meissner, 2003). The SCU reports an unexpected negative sign, but it is important to remember that all
dyads where SCU=1, have also GS=1, so the coefficient would represent the SCU effects net of the
GS, which is somewhat artificial. However, if reading together the two coefficients, they approximately
average out. The effects of formal alliances (“AllianceTreaty”) are negative. Indeed, there is no clear-cut
lesson in the literature, and the sign may vary depending on the content of the treaty (robustness test
provided in Appendix VI), on the perceived signatories’ commitment (as the benefits deriving from
trade to income can be translated into increases in military power, if the parties involved do not trust
each other, they have the incentive in lowering trade rather than increasing it, see Gowa and Mansfield
1993; Gowa 1994), and on the importance that weapons, ammunitions, and other items related to
public procurement have on overall trade (which at the time was non-negligible, see Flandreau, 2000).
29 In Italian in the original: “Il bimetallismo, zoppo qual è oggidì, non potrebbe sostenersi senza quel grande centro di
attrazione e di compensazione che è la Francia”.
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N 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503
Source: Author’s elaboration
Notes: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Imports (value). All regressions include a constant, importer-year, exporter-
year and dyad fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robustness tests
Additionally, to ensure the robustness of these findings, a set of alternative specifications have been
considered, and results are included in Table 3.
As a first robustness test, I run the standard gravity model used by Flandreau (2000) in order to
compare the results with my database extracted from RICardo (Column (1) in Table 2). The only
differences are in the dependent variable, that in my regression is “imports” only (as I take into account
the development of the debate on gravity models, e.g. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Glick and Rose,
2016), whereas in Flandreau’s paper (previous to that debate) is represented by “total trade”
(exports+imports), and in the variable representing the economic size which, to maintain coherence, in
my regression is represented by the natural logarithm of the product of population of country i and j,
instead of the logarithm of the product of total trade in country i and j, for the period 1861-1885. In
addition, the current analysis includes annual observations for each country pair, meaning – in practice
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– that relies on a panel data set structure. Flandreau’s analysis instead, is cross-sectional in nature. All
the variables have the expected signs, and are in line with Flandreau’s estimations. In addition, to have a
simply and clear picture of the sensitivity of results to alternative specifications, I report in this
appendix further robustness tests. To be concise, I focus on the main specification, the one separating
trade flows between France and other members from those among the rest of the members, for the
period 1865-1874. In column (2), I show the results using OLS, and ln(1+trade) as dependent variable
(to avoid subjective truncation). However, literature suggest (e.g. Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006;
Gomez-Herrera, 2013) that OLS – even if corrected for information losses (truncation) – does not
behave well if heteroscedasticity is present in data. Indeed, in this case, estimators will not be
consistent. The gold standard coefficient turns negative (and non-significant), consistently with
evidence collected in Gomez-Herrera (2013). Coefficients of LMUFrance and LMURest does not
change sign, but their significance is affected. However, even if the specification is ill-defined and
possibly biased, significant difference between the two remains. I also test specification: a) excluding
dyad fixed effects and cluster errors instead, to allow more variance in the data (column 3); b) excluding
Germany from the data (column 4), as literature suggests that results may be sensible to the evolution
of trade outside the currency block (e.g. Glick and Rose, 2016); c) including GDP data instead of
population data (column 5), which have the benefit of reflecting more closely the “economic mass”,
but the cost of consistently reducing the sample (-12%); d) considering only those treaties which
implied “the highest level of military commitment, requiring alliance members to come to each other’s
aid militarily if attacked by third party”, technically defined as “defense pacts” (Gibler, 2009). In
general, across different models the LMUFrance1874 coefficient is always positive and significant. The
LMURest coefficient is always negative. However, its significance depends on the specification.
Nevertheless, the central argument of this paper, a consistent difference between LMUFrance and
LMURest, is stable and significant across all specifications. Therefore I can argue that these results do
not depend on specification choices (Table 3).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1739





























































































































N 2,668 6,503 6,503 6,503 5,474 5,714 6,503
Source: Author’s elaboration
Notes: Imports. All regressions include a constant, column (2) to (6) also importer-year, exporter-year and dyad fixed effects
(unless differently specified) not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses (unless differently
specified); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Nevertheless, the gravity model alone is not able to identify beyond any reasonable doubts the precise
date in which the LMU power (in terms of within-Union trade creation) started to fade away. Further
tests are needed, and they will be provided in the subsection below.
LMU trade effects: When was the turning point? An assessment of structural breaks
Once identified the effects of the 1874 and 1885 events through the use of gravity models, the readers
may still wonder whether these outcomes may simply reflect other external shocks, like wars or
changing trade patterns. The latter is a particular concern for 1885, which indeed may only capture,
endogenously, the persistency of the decline generated by the 1874 turmoil. To test my hypotheses,
then, I need to reinforce my analysis with structural break analysis, focusing on bilateral trade relations.
The aim is to understand whether LMU countries bilateral trade flows are experiencing a “structural
break” in these dates. The procedure used is standard in the literature, and consist in performing a
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30 This procedure is robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity, differently from the traditional Chow test.
Wald test of whether the coefficients of trade flows in a specific country-pair time series regression are
varying or not (H0: no structural break).30 Table 4 shows the results of the test for LMU country-pairs
in 1874 and 1885. All the time series analysed, excluding those concerning Switzerland – France and
Switzerland – Italy (which could be subject to the flaws typical of Swiss trade data that are less evident
in a panel data structure; see Tena, 1992), show a structural break in 1874. In 1885 instead, there is no
evidence of a LMU-wide structural break.
Table 4: Structural break tests, LMU country-pairs trade flows




Belgium – Switzerland YES** NO
France – Belgium YES** YES**
Italy – Belgium YES*** NO
Belgium – Greece n.d. n.d.
France – Greece YES* NO
Switzerland – France NO NO
France – Italy YES* YES**
Italy – Greece YES** NO
Switzerland – Italy NO NO
Greece – Switzerland n.d. n.d.
Source: Author’s elaboration
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Approximately 5% of data for Italy –
Greece have been interpolated to allow the test to be performed. n.d.= no data.
Nevertheless, whereas evidence showed above is sufficient to exclude a LMU-wide effect of the 1885
treaty reform on trade flows, there is still the need of further analysis for avoiding a sort of “false
positive” identification. Indeed, I must be sure that the identified 1874 structural break affects only
within-LMU trade flows. If also other trade relationships, i.e. members with non-members, would be
affected, this would raise doubts over the proper identification of the structural break as a “LMU
shock”. Therefore I have to perform a further test for the robustness of my hypothesis, selecting
external countries not affected by other exogenous shocks in 1874, as these could introduce noise in
the results. Natural candidates are Britain, a symbol of stability, and those countries which also had a
bimetallic standard but were not part of the LMU. Arguably, this is the best possible solution to isolate
“pure-LMU” shocks. I proceed to analyse all the complete (i.e. no gaps between 1861 and 1913) time
series available for these dyads. In any of these cases bilateral trade flows registered a structural break in
1874 (see Table 5).
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Belgium – Britain NO
France – Britain NO
Greece – Britain NO
Italy – Britain NO
Switzerland – Britain n.d.
Additional tests for other bimetallic
countries
France – Austria-Hungary NO
France – Spain NO
Italy – Austria-Hungary NO
Belgium – Spain NO
Source: Author’s elaboration
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. n.d.= no
data, i.e. no sufficient data to perform the test.
Combining the outcomes of the gravity model with those of the structural break analysis, I am inclined
to postulate that the LMU affected trade flows of its members. Results show that this was the case for
trade flows between France and the rest of countries in the period 1865-1874, until its underlying
economic foundations (i.e. bimetallism) were credible to the eyes of markets. As showed in this
subsection, this represented a turning point in the evolution of trade between members. Since then, the
LMU effects on trade flows diminished. Indeed, when considering the “full pre-WWI period” of
activity, gravity models do not find any influence on the Union on trade.
Beggar-thy-neighbor
In this section, I try to shed some light on not only whether trade-enhancing monetary agreements
actually manage to enhance trade among their members, but also whether they create distortionary
effects diverting trade among member and non-member states to members’ only relationships instead.
To do so, I follow Gowa and Hicks (2013) and Yang and Martínez-Zarzoso (2014) methodology.
Therefore, starting from the same gravity model specification, I drop the dummy variables related to
monetary agreements, as – due to sample restrictions – they are collinear with the “new” dummies that
I insert to identify eventual trade diversion, i.e. an increase in trade between members’ and non-
members’ pairs. Overall, as it is possible to see in equation (1) reported in Table 6, the LMU had no
trade diverting effects, when considering the period 1861-1913 (LMU-other=0). On the contrary, there
is evidence that the gold standard had some trade diversion effects (GS-other<0). This is consistent
with the evidence proposed in the literature (Meissner, 2005), explaining the adherence to gold standard
in terms of trade-related network externalities.31 The LMU appears to have trade diverting effects
particularly in the periods when it enjoyed market credibility, i.e. until when bimetallism lost its
attractiveness as an alternative to gold (LMU-other+LMU-other1874<0). It is important to note that
results are consistent with the ones reported in Table 2, concerning trade effects of monetary
agreements among their members.
31 Meissner highlights also the importance of a more accessible borrowing and the level of development as drivers of gold
standard membership.
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N 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503
Source: Author’s elaboration
Notes: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Imports (value). All regressions include a constant, importer-year, exporter-
year and dyad fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VI. Conclusions
This paper revises the conventional view that the LMU had no overall effects on international trade. I
confirm the findings of Flandreau’s (2000) pioneering work – being the first paper using cliometric
techniques on such issues. In addition, however, I allow for heterogeneous effects on trade relations
between France and the rest of the LMU members on one side, and among the rest of LMU members
on the other side, characterising different periods of “LMU effectiveness” based on historical
circumstances and evidence, and using an augmented gravity model which also take into account
political powers. Within such framework, this study has shown that the LMU was relevant for trade
flows under certain conditions.
Indeed, if analysing the entire period under consideration (1865-1913), estimates show an insignificant
effect on overall within-LMU trade, a result that mirrors its institutional weaknesses. Nevertheless,
when considering factors related to the changing conditions in the international environment affecting
the LMU underlying economic foundations (i.e. the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 1874) and
the rules of the Union (i.e. the “liquidation clause” of 1885), the data support the hypothesis that the
LMU had significant trade effects for the period 1865-1874. These effects were nonetheless
concentrated in the flows between France and the rest of LMU members. Moreover, structural break
analysis confirmed that only in 1874 (and not in 1885) there was a “LMU-wide” structural break, which
affected the evolution of trade flows within the Union. These new findings are in line with the new
primary sources obtained from archival research and included in the paper, and previous qualitative
evidence available in the literature.
Even if it is tempting to expand and apply the results to present times, we should keep in mind that the
LMU structure never reached a level of complexity and development similar to the current EU
architecture: it did not foresee any prearranged form of structural intervention at the Union level, nor
shared decision methods going beyond the intertwinement of varied international relations within a
framework of pure intergovernmental procedures. Any comparison should therefore be extremely
cautious taking into consideration the level of integration reached in contemporary times within the
EU, being the Euro (and consequently a common European Central Bank) and the “community”
method for decision making (emphasising the supranational sphere) two overarching examples.
However, the LMU represented a political entity – with an inadequate institutional backbone – which
struggled for decades to adapt itself to a fast-changing economic reality, and finally failed in its attempt.
Under this perspective, the LMU provides potential lessons. The LMU limited engagement with
supranational activities and its weak institutional setting – lacking of any shared space where to build
constant, fluent, and multi-stakeholder networks (with the exception of ad hoc conferences held in
Paris) – was unsuccessful in establishing a consistent Union-level economic space.
Further research is needed to discern the drivers of the LMU heterogeneous effects on trade flows, to
embrace (or reject) the hypotheses of 1) an underlying Heckscher-Olhin type of trade involving
exchanges of differentiate goods within the LMU; 2) significant LMU-related capital exports
influencing trade flows; 3) various institutional and political drivers associated to the LMU structure.
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Appendix I: Luigi Luzzatti in the Italian political arena
The importance of Luigi Luzzatti in the Italian political arena and its internationally respected role as a
scholar in the discipline of economics are widely acknowledge both by historians and politicians. A
clear example of its relevance is the publication dedicated to him by the Archive of the Italian Chamber
of the Deputies, a privilege and a honour reserved to few other Italian personalities. The introduction
of the book is signed by the President of the Chamber himself that wanted to actively contribute to the
promotion of this historical document.
Luigi Luzzatti actively worked for almost fifty years (1871-1920)32 within the Italian public institutions,
as a deputy of the Chamber (in fourteen legislatures), as a Minister (of Treasury and Finance, in 1891-
1892; 1896-1898; 1903-1905 and in 1906), as President of the Council of Ministers (1910-1911), and
lastly as a Senator. In addition to that, for long time he was one of the Italian delegates to the LMU and
to the International Monetary Conventions and, since 1875 until WWI, he was responsible, with
different roles, for trade and tariff negotiations. During this long period, his work focused mainly in the
following and largely relevant fields: Constitutional law, political economy, public finance, credit and
banking, agricultural and industrial development, social rights, international trade and monetary issues,
financial markets and capital flows. Unquestionably he was one of the key actors on political economy
and finance matters, both when his party was in power and at the opposition.
The Luzzatti (personal) Archive in Venice (his home town) collects an impressive amount of
documents since the family’s donation to the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, authorised by
the R.D. of 9 February 1933.
The Luzzatti Archive is constituted by 400 folders containing approximately 100,000 documents, of
which 35,000 are letters addressed to or received from the most important European and Italian
political and economic stakeholders of that time, such as Director Generals of diverse Bank of Issues,
Presidents of the Council of Ministers, Senators and Deputies, LMU delegates, etc.
This appendix is based on the following documents:
Ballini P.L., P. Pecorari, F. Margiotta Broglio and M. Toscano (eds.) (2013), Luigi Luzzatti. Discorsi
Parlamentari, Roma: Camera dei deputati – Archivio storico.
Franchini S.G. (2007), “Le carte di Luigi Luzzatti per la storia d’Italia”, Clio, 4:625-639.
Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti official website: www.istitutoveneto.it.
Nardi Spiller C. (1994), “Luigi Luzzatti e l’Unione Monetaria Latina”, in P.L. Ballini and P. Pecorari
(eds.) Luigi Luzzatti e il suo tempo: atti del Convegno internazionale di studio, Venezia 7-9 novembre 1991,
Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti.
32 Actually, Luzzatti started in 1869 working few months as Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and
Trade.
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Appendix II: LMU membership
Table A.II.1: LMU (membership and shadowing) chronology
Country Condition Date Period
Belgium LMU founding
member
23 December 1865 (W) 1865-1927
France LMU founding
member
23 December 1865 (W) 1865-1927 (H)
Italy LMU founding
member
23 December 1865 (W) 1865-1927 (H)
Switzerland LMU founding
member
23 December 1865 (W) 1865-1926 (from 1920
Switzerland banned the
imports of LMU coins)
(H)
Greece LMU member 10 April 1867 declaration of




admission by all member
states (W)
1865-1927 (H)
Algeria (French colony) shadowing 23 December 1865 (W) n.a.
Austria-Hungary shadowing (aligned for
25 francs gold only)
n.a. 1870-1892 (E)
Bulgaria shadowing 17 May 1880 (W) 1881-1914 (E)
Colombia (United States of) shadowing 9 May 1871 (W) n.a.
Finland shadowing (aligned for
gold only)
9 August 1877 (W) 1878-1914 (E)




Poland shadowing 1926 (E) 1926 (E)
Pontifical State shadowing 1866 (E) 1866-1870 (E)
Romania shadowing 14 April 1867 law approval
1 January 1868 entrance
into force (W)
1867-1914 (E)
Russia shadowing (aligned for
gold only)
n.a. 1886-1895 (E)
Serbia shadowing 11 November 1878 (W) 187*-1914 (E)
Spain shadowing 19 October 1868 (W) 1868-1914 (E)
Sweden shadowing (aligned for
gold only)
n.a. 1868-1872
Tunisia (French colony) shadowing 23 December 1865 (W) n.a.
Venezuela (United States
of)
shadowing 11 May 1871 (W) n.a.
Source: Willis (1901), Einaudi (2007), and Helleiner (2003)
Notes: (W) = Willis; (E) = Einaudi; (H) = Helleiner. There are some discrepancies for some of the Balkans countries: (1) for
Serbia, Einaudi states that it “adopted LMU type legislation in 1873 and started minting in 1874.” (p.34), (2) for Bulgaria
that it “adopted legislation in June 1880 and started minting bronze in 1881 and silver in 1882.” As the 25 francs gold coin
was never minted, Austria minted “gold trade coins”, which never became part of the national monetary system, but they
remained confined in an ad-hoc system for international trade and were exchanged following their value at the stock market
(p. 34).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1739
Appendix III: LMU agreements – a chronology
Table A.III.1: LMU conferences brief chronology and main achievements
Date and classification Main achievements
23 December 1865 - Convention x LMU agreement signed (Belgium, France, Italy,
Switzerland) for a 15 years period;
x Rules on coinage, particularly on fineness, weights
and issuance;
x Open-ended admission clause: possibility to join
for other interested countries.
18 November 1868 – French Government declaration x Greece admission ratified by all the LMU members.
31 January 1874 – Additional Convention x Coinage limits for 1874;
x Limits to “open-ended” admission clause:
Admission formally subordinated to the previous
agreement of all members.
5 February 1875 – Declaration x Coinage limits for 1875;
x Exceptional coinage concessions to Italy.
3 February 1876 – Declaration x Coinage limits for 1876.
1877 Diplomatic correspondence x Coinage limits for 1877.
1878 Diplomatic correspondence x Coinage limits for 1878.
5 November 1878 – Declaration x Coinage limits for 1879.
5 November 1878 – Convention x Extension of the LMU for a 6 years period. The
agreement includes the possibility of a year-on-year
renewal after the first six;
x Provisional suspension of the 5 francs silver coinage
(despite the provisional nature of the measure, the
prohibition of issuing new coins will remain valid
until the end of the LMU);
x Stipulates the repatriation conditions for Italian
divisionary coins
20 June 1879 – Additional Act x Foresees changes in the repatriation conditions for
Italian divisionary coins (the Italian Parliament was
called to choose between the 1878 and 1879
agreement, selecting the latter)
6 November 1885 - Convention x Extension of the LMU for a 5 years period. The
agreement includes the possibility of a year-on-year
renewal after the first five;
x Confirms and includes the “repatriation” principle
(i.e. “liquidation clause”);
x Specifies the “repatriation” rules;
x Specifies the conditions under which the Banque de
France will accept other members’ coins.
12 December 1885 – Additional Act x Confirms the adhesion of Belgium to the LMU.
15 November 1893 – Arrangement x Regulates the “repatriation” of Italian divisionary
coins
29 October 1897 – Additional Convention x Increases the coins/population ratio (from 6 to 7
francs per habitant).
15 March 1898 – Additional Protocol x Ends the circulation of Italian divisionary coins.
15 November 1902 – Additional Convention x Provisions on coins issuance
4 November 1908 – Additional Convention x Increases the coins/population ratio (from 7 to 16
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francs per habitant);
x Regulates the “repatriation” of Greek divisionary
coins.
25 March 1920 – Additional Convention x Regulates the reciprocal “repatriation” of
divisionary coins between France and Switzerland;
x Provisions on coin issuance
9 December 1921 – Additional Convention x Regulates the “repatriation” of LMU divisionary
coins from Switzerland (after they were declared out
of circulation)
28 December 1925 – Belgian Government Declaration x Declares the willingness of Belgium of exiting the
LMU;
x The other members agree on ending the LMU
experience.
Source: Einaudi (2001); Flandreau (2000, 2003); “Procès-Verbaux” of the different LMU conferences (1874; 1875; 1876;
1879; 1885; 1893); Treaties of the different LMU conventions and the agreements (1865; 1878; 1885; 1908).













Spain De jure never adhered to the gold standard
Sweden 1873-1914
Switzerland 1878-1914
United Kingdom 1774-1797 and 1821-1914
Source: Officer.
Note: The table reports information for all the countries included in the sample.
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